Aristocracy and modernism: Signs of aristocracy in Marcel Proust's - À la Recherche du temps perdu by Chesney D.M.
Aristocracy and Modernism: Signs of Aristocracy in Marcel 
Proust's A la Recherche du temps perdu 
Duncan McColl Chesney
MLN, Volume 120, Number 4, September 2005 (French Issue), pp. 871-895
(Article)
Published by Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI:
For additional information about this article




MLN 120 (2005): 871–895 © 2005 by The Johns Hopkins University Press
Aristocracy and Modernism: Signs
of Aristocracy in Marcel Proust’s
À la Recherche du temps perdu
❦
Duncan McColl Chesney
The heir to Balzacian obsession, Proust, for
whom every social invitation seems an “open
Sesame” to restored life, escorts us into
labyrinths where primeval gossip conveys to
him the dark secrets of all splendour, until
this becomes, under his too close and
yearning gaze, dull and cracked. Yet the
placet futile, the preoccupation with a
historically-condemned luxury class whose
superfluity any bourgeois could show by
calculations, the absurd energy squandered
on the squanderers, is more thoroughly
rewarded than the unclouded eye for the
relevant.
—Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia, § 1071
The Salon, Distinction, and Class Struggle
It is undeniable that “class struggle” constitutes a central part of the
world of Proust’s novel, if we mean by this the major cultural battle
fought out during the Third Republic between the ascendant bour-
geoisie and the persistent ancien régime, to borrow Arno Mayer’s
1 Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Verso,
1974).
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phrase.2 The dominance of the bourgeoisie, claims Mayer, has been
grossly overstated in the historiography of the transition from feudal-
ism to early and then industrial capitalism, and to Modernity. While
that dominance economically, and in terms of financial and govern-
ment posts, may or may not be overemphasized, certainly cultural
hegemony was by no means secured overnight, as if the Revolution, in
overturning a society of orders politically, had revolutionized the
rules of society and art. The old order persisted until the final
decimation of the vestiges of nobility in the Great War and the
fundamental (technological) changes in art, pastimes, and public
gatherings (for instance, through the moving picture) definitively
modified the cultural landscape.
This continuity in the social sphere can be observed clearly
through a focus on the specific space of the salon. One can discern
there how the cultural hegemony of the elite was cashed out in
specific codes of comportment and conversation and how, through
the ruses of distinction and the “laws of imitation,” homo hierarchicus
persisted even while the political basis of a society of orders was
undermined by absolutist and republican evolutions. What are at
stake in the salon are the forms of distinction that govern social
interaction among the ruling classes in France during this period.
Distinction, a term I borrow from Pierre Bourdieu,3 is most broadly
an evaluative recognition of difference within a general economy of
symbolic capital. More specifically, as I intend the term here, it means
adherence to, or interpellation by, a set of rules governing the
manifestation and discernment of elements of a differential, formal
system of signs which bear the burden of expressing, legitimizing, and
reproducing power, prestige, and ideological class domination. The
salon is a theater of distinction, and, as a space dominated by the
nobility, is a veritable workshop of the “signs of aristocracy.” Perhaps
more famously, the salon is also the center of the cultural and artistic
life of France.
The codes of distinction were modified but retained over the
course of the Enlightenment period to such an extent—one need
2 For a study of Proust in this respect, see Michael Sprinker, History and Ideology in
Proust (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994). Mayer’s book, indispensable for any study
on class and Modernism, is The Persistence of the Old Regime (New York: Pantheon, 1981).
3 For example, but not exclusively, in La Distinction: critique sociale du jugement (Paris:
Minuit, 1979).
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only think of the contemporary stereotypes of France as the most
cultivated and conversible of cultures—that they survived the up-
heaval of the Revolution, and were relatively easily resuscitated after
the fall of the political society that gave rise to them, by the Empires
and the Restorations of the nineteenth century.4 Several key figures,
among them Balzac and Sainte-Beuve, served a reinvention of the
tradition of the salon, which thus persisted as a social institution even
as it became a lieu de mémoire, a culturally sustaining fantasy, for
republican France.
These salons continued to structure the social world of the Third
Republic. Artistic salons grew in number and importance over the
course of the nineteenth century, causing modifications in the
constitutions of more social and aristocratic gatherings.5 Above all,
the arts—music, painting, theater—reached their pinnacle as signs of
cultural capital by the Third Republic, making artists an even more
essential element to successful salons than they were in the Enlighten-
ment. However, the disappearance of a legitimate aristocracy did not
diminish the appeal of nobility to the imagination of the French
ruling and artistic classes. The well-known figure of the dandy is a sort
of fusion of the poor bohemian artist and the carefree aristocrat. It
combines a system of codified behavior, dress, and speech with a
newer conception of aesthetics: the representation of self in society as
an artistic project.6 Salons continued to play a vital role in the social
life of France, and the young Proust put a great deal of effort and
emotion into succeeding in these venues, making, like his narrator in
the Recherche, a remarkable ascent. The excitement over and invest-
ment in worldly life we discover in Proust’s biography and his letters,
however, only serves to confuse readers of the Recherche, indeed of any
of Proust’s writings. Can we really imagine Proust all along as cynical
and lucid about his social life, maintaining like Flaubert that “le but
de la vie de l’écrivain est dans son œuvre, et que le reste n’existe ‘que
pour l’emploi d’une illusion à décrire’”7? What I propose to do here
4 Jean-Paul Sartre, in a related context, describes the stability of the codes of
distinction in this respect as “la contre-Révolution permanente” (Mallarmé [Paris:
Gallimard, 1986] 35).
5 This history is documented well in Pierre Bourdieu, Les Règles de l’art: Genèse et
structure du champ littéraire (Paris: Seuil, 1992), especially in Part 1, 75–245.
6 For an in-depth study of this development see Domna Stanton, The Aristocrat as Art
(New York: Columbia UP, 1980).
7 Marcel Proust, Contre Sainte-Beuve, ed. Pierre Clarac and Yves Sandre (Paris:
Gallimard-Pléiade, 1971) 265.
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is to read À la recherche du temps perdu with respect to the codes of
aristocracy reproduced in and dominating salon life as they govern
the social world of the novel. I will argue the formative role of
precisely the “signs of aristocracy” in the narrator’s artistic develop-
ment (and thus in Proust’s model of artistic subjectivity) and explore
the ways in which salon society dominates Proust’s novel, especially in
its greatest critical dimension, as a Balzacian summation of his society
(thus, as a critique of what we now call Modernity).
It is in this specific context of Third Republic “class struggle” that
the young Proust enters the world of the belle époque salons and the
world of art. As Gilles Deleuze has argued in Proust et les signes,
Proust’s narrator’s coming to understand the substance and function
of art, his apprenticeship to its sign system (exemplified in the works
of Bergotte, Vinteuil, Elstir), is interrelated with a whole task of
decipherment and semiotic education.8 The sensual signs (the
madeleine, cobblestones, napkin, and so forth), the signs of love (in
the stories of Odette and Albertine), the worldly signs (in the drawing
rooms of the Guermantes) and artistic signs are all texts to be read,
but understood only after the long, champollionian apprenticeship—
one which is not, it turns out, undialectical in that there is no lost
time (temps perdu), no false step whose negation is not sublated into a
higher form of understanding on the way to Art.9 The worldly signs,
the signs of distinction, are crucial in the narrator’s formation towards
semiotic lucidity. All relations—amorous or social—clearly reveal
their motivations, their ambiguities, and their temporality to the
practiced decoder who can thus elicit a Truth from behind their
façade and overcome their temporality.
In this sense, class—and aristocracy in particular—is a vital structur-
ing category of Proust’s fictional world, as it was of his “real” world.
The Guermantes define Marcel’s relationship to the world: at first
through their inaccessibility, the insuperable distance between Swann’s
way and theirs. This generates desire on the narrator’s part, and
therefore attentiveness to, even obsession with, distinction and the
worldly (snobbism). Next comes his fascination with the name, and
his subsequent “love” for Mme de Guermantes; then his arrival in
8 Gilles Deleuze, Proust et les signes (Paris: PUF, 1964). As Sprinker puts it: “If the
Recherche narrates the tale of Marcel’s maturing into the Narrator who has told it, the
matter of that tale has as much to do with his coming to understand the structures and
determinants of social life as it does with his having gained insight into the nature of
authentic aesthetic creation” (47). The two achievements are essentially interrelated.
9 Admittedly, this Hegelian language is foreign to Deleuze’s study.
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society, the gradual coming to knowledge, and with it, disillusion-
ment; and finally the last matinée chez la Princesse de Guermantes with its
disappointments and epiphanies. It is through the Guermantes that
Proust makes his sophisticated, unsentimental attack on society
(aristocratic and bourgeois). The increasing number of sociological
studies on Proust, accentuating his contemporaneity with the nascent
French academic discipline of sociology or reading various aspects of
Third Republican society through his great Balzacian summa, attest
not only to a change in academic fashions, but also answer to a
decided social-critical dimension of the book which has always to
some degree been recognized.10 Evidently I owe a great deal to these
studies, but I think that sociological and historical insights must, in
order to serve a literary criticism, detect and focus on the aesthetic
necessities that arise from historical situations. It will be the task of
this essay to take the history of the salon and a sociological account of
its cutural import and read them into the structure of Proust’s book,
in the hope that a clearer picture of the functioning of its fictional
world can be derived.
Le Salon mental
It seems, perhaps, a prima facie contradiction of the well-known final
judgments of the Recherche to study Proust and society, Proust and
aristocracy. Only readers of the nineteen-teens, with no distance from
literary Modernism, or with little patience for Proust’s style (for
example, Gide in 1912) could really take Proust for a straightforward
10 As Roland Barthes suggested in 1971, “L’œuvre de Proust est beaucoup plus
sociologique qu’on ne dit: elle décrit avec exactitude la grammaire de la promotion, de
la mobilité des classes. [. . .]” (“Une idée de recherche” in Le Bruissement de la langue:
Essais critiques IV [Paris: Seuil, 1984] 330). Among the scholarship of note since Barthes
articulated his research idea—and above and beyond the earlier studies of Walter
Benjamin, Emilien Carassus, Jean-François Revel, and others well known in the Proust
bibliography—I cite Pierre Zima, Pour une sociologie du texte littéraire (Paris: L’Harmattan,
1978) and L’Ambivalence romanesque: Proust, Kafka, Musil (Paris: Peter Lang, 1988); Livio
Belloï, La Scène proustienne (Paris: Nathan, 1993); Michael Sprinker, History and Ideology
in Proust ; and Catherine Bidou-Zachariasen, Proust sociologue: De la maison aristocratique
au salon bourgeois (Paris: Descartes & Cie, 1997). Bidou-Zachariasen plots the rise of the
bourgeoisie through the contrasting careers of Sidonie Verdurin and Oriane de
Guermantes (cf. especially her graphic model, 23). Her work is the most relevant to my
project, and indeed informs the very structure of my study, for it is her inattention to
the codes of aristocracy and the history of the salon that leads to a somewhat
undernuanced description of the social dynamic at work in À la recherche du temps perdu.
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dandy and snob. Readers of the book since its canonization, and
especially those readers of the Bal de têtes in the Temps retrouvé, can
have no illusions about Proust’s judgment of society. Society is a
“néant,” a void peopled by vacuous and vain social climbers, snobs,
semi-literate vestiges of an old aristocracy, anti-Semites—a whole
gamut of tedious and shallow people whose company can be counted
as nothing but time wasted or lost.
At one point the narrator laments “cette vie de mondaine dont le
désœuvrement et la stérilité sont à une activité sociale véritable ce
qu’est en art la critique à la création,” in which the Duchess “étendait
aux personnes de son entourage l’instabilité de points de vue, la soif
malsaine du raisonneur qui pour étancher son esprit trop sec va
chercher n’importe quel paradoxe encore un peu frais et ne se
gênera point de soutenir l’opinion désaltérante que la plus belle
Iphigénie est celle de Piccini et non celle de Gluck, au besoin la
véritable Phèdre celle de Pradon.”11 The absolute sterility and empti-
ness, not only of these judgments, but of the questions posed in the
first place, is depressingly clear. Indeed, Proust’s criticism of society
and the salon is so deep that he even rejects the legitimacy of its
characteristic mode of interaction: conversation.
Worldly conversation is empty, for it is constrained by forms and
codes. One’s interlocutors are often fools and snobs; its values are
pace and esprit, not real dialogue. Conversation uselessly occupies
one’s energies, and caught in the barren game of wit, one is
distracted from more productive forms of attention.12 Social conver-
sation is not even enjoyable (2: 817). Worse yet, the habitual effect of
“social-life” presents a real danger for the development of the self.
Ultimately, conversation corrupts even the imagination, for the mind
becomes habituated to a sort of internal conversation that gradually
becomes a true hindrance to thought. At one point the narrator has
a premonition of this internal néant as he imagines scenarios in which
he impresses Swann and gains further access to Gilberte:
Je me posais à moi-même des questions fictives choisies de telle façon que
mes traits brillants ne leur servissent que d’heureuse repartie. Silencieux,
11 Marcel Proust, À la Recherche du temps perdu, ed. Jean-Yves Tadié et al. 4 vols (Paris:
Gallimard-Pléiade, 1987–1989) 2: 761.
12 Unable to recall the appearance of a salon room he had been in, the narrator
suggests, “le besoin de parler n’empêche pas seulement d’écouter, mais de voir, et dans
ce cas l’absence de toute description du milieu extérieur est déjà une description d’un
état interne” (2: 841).
877M L N
cette exercise était pourtant une conversation et non une méditation, ma
solitude une vie de salon mentale où c’était non ma propre personne mais
des interlocuteurs imaginaires qui gouvernaient mes paroles et où
j’éprouvais à former, au lieu des pensées que je croyais vraies celles qui me
venaient sans peine, sans régression du dehors vers le dedans, ce genre de
plaisir tout passif que trouve à rester tranquille quelqu’un qui est alourdi
par une mauvaise digestion. (1: 569)
The “mental salon life” can be taken as the definitive figuration of the
“brain damage” one risks by frequentation of salons and constant
engagement in worldly conversation. The great example of the effect
of this pernicious habit on an artistic sensibility is of course Swann,
whose scholarly and literary inclinations, in this empty worldly
atmosphere, degrade into idolatry and impotence.
The Hidden Truth
I want to look now at a specific episode that is fundamental to my
reading of aristocracy in the formation of the narrator, for his nascent
artistic impulse is inextricable from the early experience of distinc-
tion. As so often in the Recherche, an infatuation begins with a name,
Guermantes, and the imaginative embellishment of the fascinated
mind of a child coming to know his surroundings and their history
filtered through legend. In fact, the narrator will never fully lose his
association of the Guermantes with the landscape and history of
Combray, with the first experiences and impressions of childhood,
with the mystery of the fabled French past. And it is no coincidence
that immediately after his first exploration of the mystery of
Guermantes (1: 169), the narrator, dreaming of scenarios in which he
knows and pleases the duchess, thinks of his artistic ambition. “Je
rêvais de Mme de Guermantes. [. . .] Elle me faisait lui dire le sujet
des poèmes que j’avais l’intention de composer. Et ces rêves
m’avertissaient que puisque je voulais un jour être un écrivain, il était
temps de savoir ce que je comptais écrire” (1: 170). In a sense this is
simply the desire to be valued by the dreamed-of Duchess, the desire
for her desire figured through the narrator’s own nascent (aesthetic)
value system. And no sooner does the fantasy conjure the real
concern of his getting to work than “mon esprit s’arrêtait de
fonctionner, je ne voyais plus que le vide en face de mon attention, je
sentais que je n’avais pas de génie ou peut-être une maladie cérébrale
l’empêchait de naître” (1: 170).
Soon after this period, the situation arises, in the marriage of Dr.
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Percepied’s daughter, for young Marcel actually to see, if from afar,
the dreamy Mme de Guermantes, who turns out to be “une dame
blonde avec un grand nez, des yeux bleus et perçants, une cravate
bouffante en soie mauve, lisse, neuve et brillante, et un petit bouton
au coin de nez,” and with a general redness of visage that bore only
“des parcelles d’analogie” with a portrait of her he had had the
fortune to see, filtered through his fantastic imagination (I, 172).
Deeply disappointed, the narrator is nonetheless not long deflated,
for the persistence of the real vision battles in his mind with the Idea
of her name, until the image is readjusted. Moments later, willfully
ignoring anything Mme de Guermantes’s face has in common with
more banal women, the narrator can affirm, “Qu’elle est belle!
Quelle noblesse! Comme c’est bien une fière Guermantes, la descen-
dante de Geneviève de Brabant, que j’ai devant moi!” (1: 174).
Following this event in the passage from “Combray II” we again
find the narrator despairing over his lack of talent. Not, however, out
of pure nascent sexual desire or desire for affirmation (although
there are knightly gallant dreams of vulnerability and domination),
or not only out of such desire does he thus fantasize. The passage
continues: “bien en dehors de toutes ces préoccupations littéraires et
ne s’y rattachant en rien, tout d’un coup un toit, un reflet de soleil
sur une pierre, l’odeur d’un chemin me faisait arrêter par un plaisir
particulier qu’ils me donnaient, et aussi parce qu’ils avaient l’air de
cacher au-delà de ce que je voyais, quelque chose qu’ils invitaient à
venir prendre et que malgré mes efforts je n’arrivais pas à découvrir”
(1: 176). This obscure call disturbs the narrator in his inability to
perceive in the objects the cause of his pleasure. “Comme je sentais
que cela se trouvait en eux, je restais là, immobile, à regarder, à
respirer, à tâcher d’aller avec ma pensée au-delà de l’image ou de
l’odeur.” Why? Because this is precisely the lesson he has just learned
from Mme de Guermantes. Her appearance, with its flaws and
common elements, might not speak its value to anyone, but the
narrator knows that a glorious past of power, romance, and dignity
shines forth from the eyes and visage of the duchess. He knows this
because in a sense he, through her name, endowed her with all of her
glory.
A half-truth has suggested itself to the artistically-inclined narrator,
enabled by his quickly self-preserving reassessment of Mme de
Guermantes. The world is full of objects that emit complex signals,
but how are they to be read? It is precisely at this point that the
famous episode of the steeples of Martinville occurs. Marcel and his
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parents, out on a longer walk than usual, meet Dr. Percepied who
collects them in his coach, but must make a medical visit in Martinville-
le-Sec before he can return them home. The narrator propped in
front with the coachman then experiences one of the key epiphanies
of the Recherche as he watches the changing relation of the steeples
and their deceptive distance from the coach (1: 177–78). In a flash
the narrator grasps the insight that he lacked in the face of the
hearkening objects of his walks: it is he, it is the coach, the subject
that is moving, changing, not ( just) the object. The search cannot
limit itself to the object “ne se rapportant à aucune vérité abstraite.” It
is the subject, the perceiver who supplies that link, just as it had been
the narrator who furnished Mme de Guermantes with her glory.
Immediately,13 this insight is articulated by the narrator in a creative
impulse. And this first glimmer of the role art will play not only in
communicating, but also in helping to perceive the truths of nature
and society is established here in a way inextricable from the appeal
and romance of Mme de Guermantes. Her image will undergo a
great deal of scrutiny over the course of the next few thousand pages,
but it will never entirely lose the power it has in this enabling moment
of the narrator’s artistic vocation.
Mme de Villeparisis
Another episode illustrates well the sentimental and semiotic educa-
tion of the narrator. Mme de Villeparisis, as we know from the first
Balbec sequence in À l’ombre des jeunes filles en fleurs, is a Guermantes
cousin (aunt of the Duke and Duchess) who has become somewhat
déclassée over the years because of her artistic and literary commit-
ments. Mme de Villeparisis’s salon is the only representation in
Proust’s book of the aristocratic literary salon so important to the
history of French letters and consequently for the purposes of this
study. There is, of course, in the Recherche a whole gamut of salon
types. At one extreme is the purely social, aristocratic gathering of the
princess de Guermantes described in Sodome et Gomorrhe. Somewhat
less extreme is the duchess de Guermantes’s salon described in Le
Côté de Guermantes II. Oriane is more idiosyncratic, more open to
13 Actually, not immediately. The narrator’s first impulse is to talk about it, have a
conversation. “Le cocher, qui ne semblait pas disposé à causer, ayant à peine répondu
à mes propos, force me fut, faute d’autre compagnie, de me rabattre sur celle de moi-
même et d’essayer de me rappeler mes clochers” (1: 178).
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artistic trends and more committed to the necessary aesthetic dimen-
sion of fashionability than her cousin Marie-Gilbert. In the middle is
Mme de Villeparisis who, with the “spirit of a second-rate writer,” yet
a born and bred Guermantes, is at the real center of the aristocratic
and cultural exchange of the period. Further in the direction of art is
Sidonie Verdurin, who will of course exemplify the shift in the social
kaleidoscope throughout the book, culminating in her replacement
of Marie-Gilbert as the Princesse de Guermantes (a no less remark-
able rise than that of Gilberte Swann [de Forcheville de Saint-Loup],
but more important for a study of the role of art and aristocracy in the
book). On the other side of Mme Verdurin is Odette, whose gather-
ings lack aristocratic glamor and any profound commitment to art,
but simplify the signs of both into pure fashionability.
In a way, if the Duchess de Guermantes and Mme Verdurin
represent the two crucial elements of the social story of the Recherche,
Mme de Villeparisis, as the hinge between them, pinpoints the
essential relation between the bourgeoisie and the aristocracy as it is
played out in the artistic and cultural sphere. If the aristocratic
cousins of Mme de Villeparisis (Saint-Loup, the Duke and Duchess de
Guermantes and so forth) were not forced into contact with a wider
cross-section of the artistic and academic bourgeoisie (the narrator
and Bloch, Legrandin, the historian, the writer G***, and so forth),
the victory of Mme Verdurin would not be possible. Her accumula-
tion of cultural (and other) capital is contingent on her ever-
changing stable of artists and academicians. There had to be a
preliminary rapprochement, a gesture from both directions (“up” from
the bourgeoisie and “down” from the aristocracy). The object and
emblem of this peace is art.
As the narrator enters Mme de Villeparisis’s salon, she is seated at
her desk, apparently in the process of painting a floral still life (2:
486–87). Among the guests already assembled (the bourgeois always
seems to arrive early) are an archivist, a solemn and intimidated
historian of the Fronde (both present on business), and a young
dramatic author, who is none other than Marcel’s childhood friend
Bloch. Mme de Villeparisis entertains this crew by talking of aristo-
crats and courtly history. This is interrupted by the arrival of Alix, the
second of the three Fates (Parcae) of the Faubourg Saint-Germain,
fallen but illustrious ladies who hold on to what little prestige they
can through family connections but who no longer, for forgotten
transgressions, belong to the highest echelons of their society. Alix is
scoping out the guests for possible recruits for her own Friday group
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(indeed whispering an invitation to the narrator!), and proceeds to
argue with Mme de Villeparisis over a portrait of the Duchess of
Montmorency, Liszt, and other points of snobbish one-upmanship.
This is interrupted by the arrival of Mme de Guermantes, whom Mme
de Villeparisis hardly even greets, and then, uninvited, Legrandin,
the snob, who proves himself embarrassingly overeager to please.
The scene is well set here: the artistic pretensions of the hostess,
the presence of a variety of pedants and upstarts as well as rivals and
illustrious relatives. Everyone is making her campaign of distinction
in a general performative display that is quite bewildering, though
not to the narrator, who seems to float in and out of various
conversations relatively easily.14 At this point the narrator contem-
plates the Duchess who, as Mme de Villeparisis’s niece, has stopped
by as a matter of familial duty. Once again he muses, “Son nom,
comme il était accompagné de son titre, ajoutait à sa personne son
duché qui se projettait autour d’elle et faisait régner la fraîcheur
ombreuse et dorée des bois de Guermantes au milieu du salon, à
l’entour du pouf où elle était. Je me sentais seulement étonné que
leur ressemblance ne fût pas plus lisible sur le visage de la duchesse”
(2: 501–02). This is, as we have seen, the projective imagination of the
neophyte narrator, still learning about the world and his role in its
interpretation. The next sentence, however, comes from the much
wiser retrospective narrator.
Plus tard, quand elle me fut devenue indifférente, je connus bien de
particularités de la duchesse, et notamment [. . .] ses yeux, où était captif
comme dans un tableau le ciel bleu d’une après-midi de France, largement
découvert, baigné de lumière même quand elle ne brillait pas; et une voix
qu’on eût crue, aux premiers sons enroués, presque canaille, où traînait,
comme sur les marches de l’église de Combray ou la pâtisserie de la place,
l’or paresseux et gras d’un soleil de province. (2: 502)
I shall have occasion later to analyze this association of Mme de
Guermantes with France and the peasantry. For the moment I should
point out that the comparison is offered, in this passage, as a truth
14 “In A la recherche du temps perdu, the work of distinction begins with the imagined
position of the narrator, able, increasingly, to disengage himself from the world around
him, to see himself as neutral, truth-seeking, and [. . .] without signs. From this vantage
point, he is able to perceive the world in terms of pattern and repetition, and to make
sense of, music out of, what might otherwise be perceived as a cacophony of voices.
From this vantage point, he is able to overlook the role of his desires and ethnic
identity forming his judgments of social issues.” Lynn R. Wilkinson, “The Art of
Distinction: Proust and the Dreyfus Affair,” MLN 107 (1992): 992.
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that will survive, indeed will only be possible after the disillusionment
of the narrator with Mme de Guermantes and her world.
Distinction and the Affair
One further episode during Mme de Villeparisis’s tea party must be
noted, however, for at a certain point, through the very marked Bloch
and the fatuous diplomat Norpois, the Dreyfus Affair enters squarely
into the matinée and into Proust’s novel. A great deal has been written
about Proust’s treatment of the Affair, about his actual assiduous
defence (“I was the first Dreyfusard”)15 and the complex metamor-
phosis of this commitment in the literary text, about which the least
that can be said is that it teaches a lesson in the danger of mistaking
the two Marcels. For while we are given to assume the narrator’s
Dreyfusard stance, the novel is much more concerned with analyzing
the role of the Affair on French society than it is in taking sides (in
Julia Kristeva words, to “dépasser la souffrance juive pour atteindre le
style de Saint-Simon”).16 Indeed Proust is quite willing to paint Bloch
with no little contemporary anti-Semitic coloration.17 Bloch’s em-
blematic exteriority to polite society—the unassimilable Jew—is richly
developed during the course of this tea party. His gaffes serve
negatively to accentuate the coherence and force of tacit social rules.
What is more, his agony, his sacrifice (notwithstanding the ultimate
victory of Jacques du Rozier in a changed society) is quite necessary to
the event as well: that is why he is there (in addition to his nascent
dramatic talent).18
Hannah Arendt’s discussion of the Dreyfus Affair and Proust in the
“Antisemitism” section of The Origins of Totalitarianism explores the
change in understanding and representation of Jewishness over the
period of the late nineteenth century, especially as it is implicated
with the changing understanding of homosexuality. In the general
15 George Painter, Proust: The Early Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1959) 273.
16 Julia Kristeva, Le Temps sensible: Proust et l’expérience littéraire (Paris: Gallimard, 1994)
185.
17 “The narrator’s emphasis on Bloch’s difference, of course, points accusingly to
their similarities. Both are outsiders, parvenus, and Dreyfusards” (Wilkinson 982). Cf.
also Albert Sonnenfeld, “Marcel Proust: Antisemite?” The French Review, 62:1 (October
1988): 25–40 and 62:2 (December 1988): 275–82.
18 “Car les juifs, ces singuliers, tendent un miroir aux singularités du clan, des clans.
Aristocrates ou homosexuels, élus du sang ou élus du sexe, y reconnaissent leurs
différences” (Kristeva 197).
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boredom of belle époque France, the aristocrats turned increasingly to
Jews and homosexuals (as to artists), without really reassessing
received notions of the two groups as criminal. Arendt’s interest is to
show how a de facto decriminalization did not come in the form of an
exoneration; rather crime was transformed into vice, for its
transgressiveness was of course the source of its excitement. Vicious-
ness, however, is hardly treatable, and the fatality of vice leads,
according to Arendt, ultimately to Final Solutions. This thesis and its
implications fall outside of the scope of this essay. However, the
coupling of Jew and homosexual—for the benefit of the aristocrat—
here under the curious gaze of the incipient artist, presents a
particularly suggestive account of distinction as it governs the social
world of France and of Proust’s novel.
Distinction, as I have suggested, is the evaluative recognition of
difference and its manifestation in signs. It is therefore always
performative, negative, and community- or clique-building. It is not
about individuals, but about groups. En être ou n’en être pas, that is the
question (3: 410). Groups are of course not defined by essential traits,
but by signs, by shared codes of behavior, conversation, dress. And it
is in the nature of distinction to naturalize the marks of distinction.
To belong is simply to be, and certainly not to try. Désinvolture is
inextricable from a notion of inherent qualities. The aristocracy,
which was already by the seventeenth century considerably severed
from its feudal, military roots, was always mainly a differentiating
code—“l’art infiniment varié [. . .] de marquer les distances” (2:
736)—and the salon was the laboratory for its adaptation and
continuity, its presentation and reproduction. Similar in its logic is
the function and definition of these other groups. Both the “Jewish
clique” and the “inverts,” according to Arendt, “felt either superior or
inferior, but in any case proudly different from other normal beings;
both believed their difference to be a natural fact acquired at birth;
both were constantly justifying not what they did, but what they were;
and both, finally, always wavered between such apologetic attitudes
and sudden, provocative claims that they were an elite” (84).19 What
separates these various groups from the aristocats, however, is a
differing sense of community: “[. . .] all marks of distinction were
determined only by the ensemble of the cliques, so that Jews or
inverts felt that they would lose their distinctive character in a society
19 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (1948; New York: Harvest, 1973) 84.
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of Jews or inverts, where Jewishness or homosexuality would be the
most natural, the most uninteresting, and the most banal thing in the
world” (85).
We are not dealing here with an abstract sociological or psychologi-
cal model of community or identity, for the fundamental aspect of
this social situation is power, and the aristocrats are not merely one
group among others marking their differences and defending their
turf. Or if they are—and certainly the ambiguity and limits of a
nobility decimated by the revolution, slowly rebuilt but contaminated
by an entirely new Imperial aristocracy, and gradually diluted by
lucrative marriages in an era of industrial and banking ascendancy
make of them a difficult group to define—there is a different
dimension to their distinction. I have above specified my definition of
distinction as adherence to a set of rules concerning the manifesta-
tion and discernment of elements of a differential, formal system of
signs which bear the burden of reproducting power and prestige.
This is the distinction of the aristocrats, indeed of anyone who would
gain admittance into their ranks, not as monkeys or fools, titillating
Orientals or audacious queers, but, pares cum paribus, as those who
belong. I believe Julia Kristeva’s otherwise extremely interesting
critique of Arendt in Le Temps sensible, where she identifies a “logique
du sadomasochisme” at the heart of clannishness and distinction, falls
short of an explanation of the role of aristocracy in Proust’s world.
For Kristeva “vice” is not an accidental, historical development but a
necessary aspect of inter-psychological intercourse. “Chaque groupe
s’agglutine autour d’un être pas comme les autres et vit, avec lui et
contre lui, dans la logique du sadomasochisme: amour de la haine,
haine de l’amour, persécution, humiliation, chagrin délectable. À
cela, il n’y a pas d’issue sociale. Tout le social, le tout du social y est
compris” (197). Here I think Kristeva is being a bit too good a
Proustian. For, while according to the narrator’s pessimistic account
of interpersonal interaction, his lucid identification of self-interest,
his traumatic epistemology of truth through suffering and cruelty, a
sadomasochistic logic can be found at the heart of the world of the
Recherche, there is more at stake for the narrator in the social than
Kristeva’s psychological insight allows. Kristeva agrees with Proust in a
Hegelian privileging of the suffering subject. “Le narrateur, les juifs
comme Swann et les homosexuels comme Charlus, détiennent le
secret de la société, fût-elle la plus raffinée, celle de Saint-Germain. Ils
en retiennent les clés, ils en meurent, mais en vérité” (197). I do not
disagree, but there is a reason why all of these distinctions and
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sacrifices are performed for, and in jealous envy of, the aristocracy.
For the Jew and the Invert, exploiting their marked difference to gain
some kind of acceptance in society,20 want to belong, not to Sion or to
Sodom, but to the Faubourg Saint-Germain. Aristocracy is thus, to my
mind, the key mode of distinction.
We have seen that the Dreyfus Affair, like the War that will follow it,
enters the Recherche as a social reflexion, as an unstated event whose
effects consititute a spin of the social kaleidoscope. As the Baron de
Charlus says at the end of the Villeparisis’s event in a sort of seduction
of the young narrator who at this point has no insight into the codes
of homosexuality and is therefore quite impervious to any of the
Baron’s insinuations (2: 586):
Toute cette affaire Dreyfus [. . .] n’a qu’un inconvénient: c’est qu’elle
détruit la société (je ne dis pas la bonne société, il y a longtemps que la
société ne mérite plus cette épithète louangeuse) par l’afflux de messieurs
et des dames du Chameau, de la Chamellerie, de la Chamellière, enfin des
gens inconnus que je trouve même chez mes cousines parce qu’ils font
partie de la ligue de la Patrie française, antijuive, je ne sais quoi, comme si
une opinion politique donnait droit à une qualification sociale.
Dreyfus—more profoundly, but not unlike Wagner, Manet, or
Debussy—has served to alter the social landscape as a modish cause
around which cliques can form or reform. The eighteenth-century
opening of salon chat onto political concerns had broadened the
social importance of the institution, but had also subjected the
political to the rigors of fashion. Mme Verdurin’s cultural capital, for
example, soars through her Dreyfusard commitments because certain
elements of the aristocracy, intelligentsia, and art world gravitate
towards her and away from reactionary social groups, however more
illustrious and elegant they may be. Ultimately the Affair proves much
more formative than the latest artistic development in shifting
definitively the social kaleidoscope, and with the Great War, will mark
the real beginning of the end for the aristocratic dominance of the
social world in France. For the last wars, not about race and
citizenship (which are sadly still being fought in France as elsewhere),
but over the old aristocratic institutions—the church, the military,
and the state—were finally culminating in a Republic that sought to
undermine that hegemony in precisely these spheres and a retrenched
20 Exploiting . . . and performing, inventing, and subverting: thus their affinity with
the artist and the dandy.
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aristocracy exercising political power increasingly from the isolated
strongholds of their salons. The Affair shows that the balance of
power was finally tilting in the direction of the Revolution and that
the sociability and limited political critique in the salon was dissolving
into a larger public sphere (as well as re-empowered state institu-
tions) no longer reliant on older elites. For some aristocrats it meant
that “for things to stay the same, everything would have to change.”21
For others it meant an increasingly reactionary isolation that could
only lead to complete irrelevance and extinction.
Les Aimables et Bénévoles Conservateurs du passé
After the interlude of the narrator’s illness and a reintroduction of
Albertine into the Recherche, the social story of Le Côté de Guermantes
continues with a soirée chez Mme de Villeparisis, which is mainly
important for the narrator’s encounter with Mme de Guermantes.
The latter unexpectedly invites the narrator to a dîner “en petit
comité.” Coming to terms with his gratified and happy shock, the
narrator reveals a further element of his infatuation (2: 670):
Deux minutes auparavant j’eusse été stupéfait si on m’avait dit que Mme
de Guermantes allait me demander d’aller la voir, encore plus de venir
dîner. J’avais beau savoir que le salon Guermantes ne pouvait pas présenter
les particularités que j’avais extraites de ce nom, le fait qu’il m’avait été
interdit d’y pénétrer, en m’obligeant à lui donner le même genre
d’existence qu’aux salons dont nous avons lu la description dans un roman
ou vu l’image dans un rêve, me le faisait, même quand j’étais certain qu’il
était pareil à tous les autres, imaginer tout différent; entre moi et lui il y
avait la barrière où finit le réel.
A perceived interdiction had compelled the imagination to furnish
the salon with the most fantastic objects and characters drawn from
the un- or surreality of fictions and dreams. This textual and oneiric
reference is what I mean when I refer to the salon as a lieu de mémoire,
a fictional, intertextual topos invested with desire and imagination.
For some this fantasy can dominate so forcefully that they never
realize they are in a poorly heated, dim attic discussing the races at
Longchamp or the coming cold front with a third-rate writer of
symbolist poems; for others, the reality, no matter how charming and
21 “Se vogliamo che tutto rimanga come è, bisogna che tutto cambi,” as Tancredi says
to the Prince in Il Gattopardo (Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa, 1957).
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elegant, can never offer anything but disillusioning banality. Among
the latter we certainly find the narrator.
After this episode follows the soir de l’amitié with Saint-Loup.
Friendship proves anathema to the narrator, if not a downright trap
for personal development, but he still derives some pleasure from the
evening. This pleasure however “avait sa signification, sa cause, dans
la nature individuelle de Saint-Loup peut-être, mais plus encore dans
celle que, par la naissance et par l’éducation, il avait hérité de sa race”
(2: 706). This will be a recurring theme in the narration of the
evening at the Guermantes, despite the continued demythologizing
of the noble names.
Marcel arrives at the Guermantes and is met by an elegant and
affable M. de Guermantes. “[La] politesse de M. de Guermantes […]
qu’il allait me témoigner toute la soirée, me charma comme un reste
d’habitudes plusieurs fois séculaires, d’habitudes en particulier du
XVIIe siècle” (2: 710). M. de Guermantes is a master of the code of
aristocratic manners, a seemingly anachronistic survival from the
ancien régime whose hold over the French social imagination domi-
nates the social events of the Recherche. The Duc leaves the narrator to
inspect the Elstirs, and again the truth of art, as a principium
individuationis,22 suggests itself to the narrator. “[U]ne fois en tête à
tête avec les Elstirs, j’oubliai tout à fait l’heure du dîner; de nouveau
comme à Balbec j’avais devant moi les fragments de ce monde aux
couleurs inconnues qui n’était que la projection de la manière de
voir particulière à ce grand peintre et que ne traduisaient nullement
ses paroles” (2: 712). Like Chardin23 Elstir shows that the beauty and
truth of art is not in the specific object (for example, the skate) or
that object generalized. “Tout le prix est dans les regards du peintre”
(2: 714). A dinner bell tears the narrator from the aesthetic realm of
this insight and back to his elegant soirée. Wherein resides its value?
No sooner does he enter the salon than the awkward and uncom-
prehending narrator is introduced by the Duc to the Princesse of
Parma who astounds the narrator not only by manifesting a perfect
education according to “les préceptes orgueilleusement humbles
d’un snobisme évangélique” (2: 720)—which is to say, her royalty—
but also by her absolute incommensurability with any Stendhalian
22 “L’essence selon Proust [. . .] n’est pas quelque chose de vu, mais une sorte de point
de vue supérieur. Point de vue irréductible, qui signifie à la fois la naissance du monde
et le caractère original d’un monde. [. . .] Le point de vue [. . .] n’est pas individuel,
mais au contraire principe d’individuation” (Deleuze 133).
23 Marcel Proust, Contre Sainte-Beuve, “Chardin et Rembrandt,” 372–82.
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association of the name. As with the Prince d’Agrigente, “aussi
indépendant de son nom que d’une œuvre d’art qu’il eût possédée”
(2: 725), the Princesse bears little resemblance to a work of art the
narrator possesses in his head. But for all that, she is a “grande dame,”
who indeed, elicts an appropriate vassality from the Guermantes, who
know well what role to play (2: 719). The essential and profound
superficiality suggested in the passage, the seeming which commands
being (according to Paul Valéry), is the essence of the code of
aristocracy, and even as the narrator sees through the names and
ironically animadverts the cruelty and emptiness of the behavior, he
cannot help but cherish the historical and racial continuity it be-
speaks. The persistence of this admiration is extremely important,
given the general disillusionment with names that marks this social
event. If actual d’Agrigentes, Parmas, and Guermantes prove “vulgaires,
pareils à tous les hommes et à toutes les femmes,” this is because the
narrator had first seen in them fanciful names. Still, something of the
name remains in the physique, the gestures, the very blondness of the
Guermantes (2: 730–31). “Les Guermantes [. . .] n’étaient pas
seulement d’une qualité de chair, de cheveu, de transparent regard,
exquise, mais avaient une manière de se tenir, de marcher, de saluer,
de regarder avant de serrer la main, par quoi ils étaient aussi
différents en tout cela d’un homme du monde quelconque que celui-
ci d’un fermier en blouse” (2: 731). A distinguished and distinguish-
ing primary habitus, centuries of (in)breeding, and an arrogant and
gratified will to power have made the Guermantes singular and
superior, and even when he sees through their codes to their vapidity
and their cruelty, the narrator cannot help but admire the distinction
of the Duke, of Robert.
What, we might ask, is the narrator’s use for these arrogant
remainders of an earlier order? Oriane de Guermantes is not, as we
know, just an anachronistic spectre from the ancien régime. She is a
fashionable lady of fin-de-siècle Paris, well enough educated in the arts
and in political and social realities of the Third Republic. Her wit,
which gradually starts to ring false to the narrator, derives from an
atavistic arrogance and désinvolture combined with a certain indi-
vidual wilfullness and a very strong, if hidden, sense of the fashions of
the day—fashions in art and thought as well as dress and speech.
The fictional-historical suggestiveness of the Duchess as representa-
tive of her class, her race proves most meaningful to the narrator,
while her studied opinions and artistic fancies clash with his sensibili-
ties. In the least studied and willful manifestations of her character,
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the Duchess charms by this link to the past, as does Saint-Loup, Mme
de Marsantes, the Duke. Indeed there is a whole discourse in the
Recherche of “atavism” applied both to Jews and aristocrats to suggest
something of the fatality of race, despite the fact that Proust goes a
long way in dismantling contemporary notions of race. Just like her
brother, and even in spite of herself, Mme de Marsantes is an
embodiment of courtly etiquette (2: 547). Oriane seems to be subject
to the same fatality of character, just as Robert is so described,
especially when he tries hardest to be “modern.”
All this suggests that something of the fairy of the name remains,
sustaining a belief that outlives the twilight of the gods. If the world of
the salons has proven disappointing, its aristocratic participants
consistently fallen short of the promise of their names, still a truth
suggests itself (2: 839):
[. . .] si ce monde n’avait pu au premier moment répondre à ce
qu’attendait mon imagination, et devait par conséquent me frapper
d’abord par ce qu’il avait de commun avec tous les mondes plutôt que par
ce qu’il avait de différent, pourtant il se révéla à moi peu à peu comme
bien distinct. Les grands seigneurs sont presque les seules gens de qui on
apprenne autant que des paysans; leur conversation s’orne de tout ce qui
concerne la terre, les demeures telles qu’elles étaient habitées autrefois,
les anciens usages, tout ce que le monde de l’argent ignore profondément.
Françoise has been the object of this sort of insight for much of the
book, in her link back with the past, her exemplarity of the France of
Saint-André-des-Champs.24 This passage extends the equation of the
aristocracy (and the peasantry) with history, nature, indeed France,
in a way that escapes the bourgeois epoch inaugurated by the
Revolution. The aristocrats, in their language, their chateaux, their
habits, are “les aimables et bénévoles conservateurs du passé” (2:
840). As representatives of history, links to a different epoch, they also
teach a lesson about time, through their very effacement of time.
When the esprit de Guermantes surfaces in one of Oriane’s witticisms or
the courtly past in one of the Duke’s gestures, time disappears as does
their individuality, and we are confronted with the atemporal, undif-
ferentiated Guermantes of the illustrious feudal past. (An image thus
both time-bound—in the Merovingian or the courtly periods—and
24 For example, 2: 324: “ces Français de jadis, dont Françoise était, en réalité, la
contemporaine.”
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timeless—because formally retained, through language, land, tradi-
tion.) History embodied in this sense resembles the famous efface-
ment of time through involuntary memory: “[. . .] la mémoire, en
introduisant le passé dans le présent sans le modifier, tel qu’il était au
moment où il était le présent, supprime précisément cette grande
dimension du Temps suivant laquelle la vie se réalise” (4: 608).
Ultimately it is this lesson that confirms the narrator in his artistic
vocation, most famously expressed at the end of Le Temps retrouvé. The
well-known succession of those Proustian epiphanies of involuntary
memory causes in the narrator “un élargissement de mon esprit en
qui se reformait, s’actualisait ce passé, et me donnait, mais hélas!
momentanément, une valeur d’éternité” (4: 613). This glimpse sub
specie aeternitatis is the glance, through the Proustian telescope, at the
“general laws” of human interaction (4: 618), allowing, through a
subjective lesson, an understanding of the “temporal architecture of
the self.”25 On the one hand, it is a sociological as much as psychologi-
cal insight into the characters and rules of society, into self-interest,
sadomasochism, and vulnerability. More deeply this extratemporal
viewpoint allows a subjective insight, not that the other is timebound
and constantly changing, nor that “I” is an other, but that the other is
another “I” within the ever different, evolving subject, that the
evolution of the other is the history of my desire, my confusion, my
misapprehension.26 And in showing the laws that facilitate this
subjective insight, the narrator will be able not to give his readers
some packaged truth, but to make them the readers of themselves, to
teach them how to view and understand their own world: “Car ils ne
seraient pas, selon moi, mes lecteurs, mais les propres lecteurs d’eux-
mêmes, mon livre n’étant qu’une sorte de ces verres grossissants
comme ceux que tendait à un acheteur l’opticien de Combray; mon
livre, grâce auquel je leur fournirais le moyen de lire en eux-mêmes”
(4: 610).
Art, the only way to see the world, and oneself in it, through the
eyes of another,27 is the ultimate realization of the insight made
25 Malcolm Bowie, Proust Among the Stars (New York: Columbia UP, 1998) 4.
26 “[L’]enseignement le plus profond de Proust [. . .] consiste à situer le réel dans
une relation avec ce qui à jamais demeure autre, avec autrui comme absence et mystère
à la retrouver dans l’intimité même du ‘Je,’ à inaugurer une dialectique qui rompt
définitivement avec Parménide.” Emmanuel Lévinas, Noms Propres (Paris: Fata Morgana:
Paris, 1976) 123.
27 “Le seul véritable voyage, le seul bain de Jouvence, ce ne serait pas d’aller vers de
nouveaux paysages, mais d’avoir d’autres yeux, de voir l’univers avec les yeux d’un
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possible by the disappointments in love, friendship, and sociability.
True communication (unlike that in society) is possible only once
one leaves society behind, yet this can be the case only after one has
tarried in the world (beim Negativen verweilt, so to speak). Conversation
and friendship were a trap, but one whose disappointments led to
inner scrutiny. Aristocrats proved to be not essentially distinctive and
interesting, but, as embodiments of codes and laws of society, as time-
bound signs of extra-temporal truths, particularly useful indicators of
the power of time and the power of subjective, projective desire. So
there was no time lost. Once the interior stereoscope could direct its
vision, cleared of a distorting desire, the truths of society became
manifest: “Ce que m’avait dit Mme de Guermantes [. . .] était faux,
mais contenait une part de vérité qui me fut précieuse dans la suite”
(2: 837). This part of truth was always there, but never perceptible,
because it is really only a part of the subject, once ready to see.
Conclusion: Aristocracy and Modernism
Class matters in the Recherche in the sense that the social import of
Proust’s art—that is, what makes it (relevant) art in the first place—is
inconceivable outside of the framework of the social relations in his
society. But in a broader sense, the mimicry (through the “laws of
imitation,” through snobbery) that we see at work in the novel is also
“allegorical,” so to speak, of Modernist art in general. As Fredric
Jameson suggests parenthetically in a discussion of Modernity:
What has until today passed for a capitalist culture—a specifically capitalist
“high culture” that is—[. . .] can also be identified as the way in which a
bourgeoisie imitated and aped the traditions of its aristocratic, feudal
predecessors, tending to be eclipsed along with their memory and to give
way, along with the older classical bourgeois class-consciousness itself, to
mass culture—indeed to a specifically American mass culture at that.28
Modernity is, among other things, the expression of that Gleichzeitigkeit
des Ungleichzeitigen—the “synchronicity of the nonsynchronous” that
Jameson takes from Ernst Bloch to describe “unequal development”
autre, de cent autres, de voir les cent univers que chacun d’eux voit, que chacun d’eux
est; et cela nous le pouvons avec un Elstir, avec un Vinteuil, avec leurs pareils, nous
volons vraiment d’étoiles en étoiles” (3: 762).
28 Fredric Jameson, “The Antinomies of Postmodernity,” in The Cultural Turn (New
York: Verso, 1998) 67.
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on the local level, cultural (as well as structural economic) heteroge-
neity.29 It is characterized by an attempt of the ascendant class to
appropriate, through imitation and subversion, that classical, aristo-
cratic leisurely pursuit, art, which had reached, through nineteenth-
century episodes in this very process of emulation, unprecedented
levels of popularity and importance (cultural capital, if you will).
Once they succeed—and of course this is Jameson’s real concern—
then we enter into a new phase, one of homogeneity, of uniformity
and repetition. This is the Postmodern.30 What is important is that
Proust’s novel stages the final class battles for cultural hegemony
precisely insofar as they are fought through and about conversation,
comportment (behavior, dress, gesture) and art, and thereby exem-
plifies the Modern in art: this appropriation of older and no longer
relevant traditions (because the classes for whom they originated
were no longer relevant or even extant) that marked an attempt to
come to terms with a changed and alienating society. (This is one
cause of the monumental reassessment and re-appropriation of
literary traditions characteristic of the famous modernist chefs-d’oeuvre
including Ulysses, the Cantos, the Wasteland.)31
29 This uneven development—in terms of the technology, urbanization, and industri-
alization that polarized the traditional land-based cultures in England and the
Continent and the growing metropolitan centers (and later that polarized the
metropoles and the colonies)—is at the root, for example, of the Modernist focus on
temporality. It is not just that technology and industry change the rhythms and rates of
daily life, but that at this moment there is still clearly an alternative temporality alive, or
remembered, whose contrast with the new generates bewilderment, pathos.
30 This narrative has been complicated recently by Jameson in A Singular Modernity
(New York: Verso, 2002) where he introduces an intermediary phase, “Late Modern-
ism,” into his account of late capitalism. This phase is characterized by the “emergence
of [. . .] [a] full-blown ideology of modernism” (196) and a consequent reflexivity that
is not fully at play in the earlier period of Modernism proper. This is an important
development towards the Postmodern, especially in its consequences for a legitimized
semi-autonomy for the artwork that was not in place for the first moderns, but was
made possible by their successes (and failures). Cf. 196 ff.
31 The sacre de l’écrivain and the related development of “art for art’s sake” that Pierre
Bourdieu, following Sartre and Paul Bénichou, explores in Les Règles de l’art (Paris:
Seuil, 1996), is the basis for the “elitist” Modernist subject position characteristic of
Joyce, Eliot, and Pound, all of whom were influenced to some degree by the French
symbolists (Mallarmé, Laforgue, etc.). The artist as aristocrat (for example, in the
figure of the dandy) is of course on the one hand a negative response to advances in
education, literacy, and political equality. But what I am talking about with respect to
aristocracy and modernity exceeds this well-known criticism. It is rather the very
necessity of the ascendant class to appropriate the cultural forms of the waning
dominant—since at any rate this was a condition of the very possibility of its
ascendance. This is to say that the repugnant, elitist version of this succession, of which
Eliot is often accused, is merely a variant of a larger structural condition. Proust, I
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To put matters in the slightly different terms of Perry Anderson,
the “modernist conjecture” arises at a moment when the persistent
hold of earlier (feudal-aristocratic) traditions was still strong enough
in the cultural and literary spheres to structure and give meaning
(negatively) to artistic movements which arose out of the changing,
industrial and increasingly urban society. “[T]he persistence of the
‘anciens régimes,’ and the academicism concomitant with them, pro-
vided a critical range of cultural values against which insurgent forms
of art could measure themselves, but also in terms of which they could
partly articulate themselves.”32 Over the course of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries a certain aesthetic and moral ideal became
institutionalized in France—leading to what Anderson refers to as
academicism (for example, in the Salons, or painting exhibitions
chronicled by Diderot and becoming, by the time Baudelaire de-
scribes them, the definitive institution for establishing value in that
cultural domain)—but certain elements or subsets of the salon-
aristocratic society also fueled a critique of these ideals once they
became dominant. In Anderson’s words: “the old order, precisely in
its still partially aristocratic colouration, afforded a set of available
codes and resources from which the ravages of the market as an
organizational principle of culture and society—uniformly detested
by every species of modernism—could also be resisted” (35). Some of
these codes have been the object of scrutiny in this essay. I hope to
have shown how Proust learns a lesson from the crepuscular aristoc-
racy of the Third Republic that gives power and lucidity to his critique
of modern society. At the same time, Proust is one of the greatest
critics of this aristocratic society, and thus has little in common with
reactionary or nostalgic anti-modernism.
Proust is not afraid to embrace the new, but neither is he naïve in
his assessment of the modern. Making it new for newness’ sake was
never his credo. Anderson’s modernist conjecture is tripartite: the
persistent presence of the forms and ideologies of older traditions is
coupled with the incipient and novel emergence of key technolo-
gies—the telephone, automobile, aircraft, and so forth—and finally
with the “imaginative proximity of social revolution” (34). As is well
would argue (and Adorno would certainly agree), derives a positive critical position
from this state of affairs that is the very opposite of the elitist, regulatory canon
formation of an Eliot, but it is no less implicated in this moment of succession which is
the very crisis that constitutes cultural modernity.
32 Perry Anderson, A Zone of Engagement (London: Verso, 1992) 35.
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known, Proust did not shy away from the technological advances of
his time. Indeed he attests to the fact of their genuine novelty by his
awe. In an era when bets were still on as to whether the horse-drawn
carriage wouldn’t carry the day, Proust thrills to the speed of his
automobile, but still, like the monkey encountering a phonograph, in
partial disbelief and incomprehension.33 Social revolution, in Ander-
son’s sense, seems very far from Proust’s concerns, it is true, but his
whole novel is, of course, about the final rise of the bourgeoisie to
hegemony in French society. This was the earlier social revolution
Proust chose to chronicle, making possible the exploration of others
to his successors (Malraux, Sartre).
Proust’s novel, then, is a limited embrace of the modern, of the
new. The narrator inhabits and then discards the codes of the
aristocracy in order to serve his vision. But he remains skeptical—a
skepticism rendered possible by his aristocratic lesson—of what is to
come. Indeed his book culminates in an artistic project that we can
understand best through Adorno as a defiant and determinate
negation, in the nineteenth-century tradition of Baudelaire, Flaubert,
Mallarmé, of the society that will no longer have any interest in it.34
Proust is lucid about the faddishness of the bourgeoisie’s commit-
ment to art, although the text is ultimately ambivalent in this regard.
Mme Verdurin, not Oriane de Guermantes, is the true connoisseur of
art, but her love of art is accidental, strategic; its logic is not that of
Mæcenas, in the idealized seventeenth-century sense, but the logic of
the market, of fashion. At the end, it will have been a means to an
end, as Mme Verdurin metamorphoses into the Princess de
Guermantes.35
33 The best example is the description of his grandmother’s voice on the telephone
(2: 432–36).
34 “At the very moment in which it [modernist art] conceives its vocation as high art,
the latter finds its public confiscated by mass culture” (Jameson, Singular Modernity,
158). In other words, to sum up a Jamesonian thesis, the consolidation of artistic
practices into Art, made possible over the course of some fifty years from Gautier,
Flaubert, and Baudelaire to Mallarmé and Proust, is only realized at the moment this
Art is clearly differentiated from mass culture, a product of Modernity. Art, as we
conceive it, is a product of this Modernist dichotomy. My contention, following
Jameson, is that this very self-differentiation, at the twilight of one epoch and the dawn
of a new, represents the appropriation and reconfiguration of the aristocratic distinc-
tion I have documented in other spheres. The spirit of difference lives on, so to speak,
in the very semi-autonomous vocation of art to transcend mass culture, at its worst—
elitism, contempt—as at its best, as an utopian (determinate) negation of the social
situation which gives rise to the dichotomy in the first place.
35 “Le mariage du prince de Guermantes avec la Patronne réalise moins un
anoblissement de la bourgeoisie protectrice de l’art, que la pérennisation de la
médiocrité verdurinienne” (Kristeva 92).
895M L N
If Proust passes through society and art to a renunciation (the
famous cork room, symbolically), that his art might stop time and
articulate a Truth not accessible in the world, this refusal is the result
of a process. The time-out necessitated by the sheer labor of writing is
a renunciation of the world, but the negative will have been retained.
At any rate, this final renunciation has its Utopian promise in Proust.
“Through the irreconcilable renunciation of the semblance of recon-
ciliation, art holds fast to the promise of reconciliation in the midst of
the unreconciled.”36 Proust—his friends spurned, indeed all sem-
blance of normal human behavior renounced—sacrifices himself for
this beautiful promise, at perhaps the last moment it was even
conceivable.
Bilkent University (Ankara)
36 T.W. Adorno, Aesthetic Theory, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (Minneapolis: Minne-
sota UP, 1997) 33.
